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India’s insolvency process step by step: admission, resolution plans and settlement

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 replaced years of promoter-controlled delay with a creditor-led process that runs against a statutory clock. This article follows a case from admission to sanction, sets out what the record shows and explains why so many defaults now settle before a case is admitted.

October 202611 min read

Contents
  1. Admission and the change of control
  2. Claims, the committee and the clock
  3. Resolution plans, sanction and the clean slate
  4. What the record shows
  5. Why revival now outnumbers liquidation
  6. How a committee compares plans: an illustrative composite
  7. Settlement before admission, and the finance behind it

Admission and the change of control

The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) dealt with enforcement against specific assets. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (the Code) addressed a larger problem: the resolution of an entire distressed company. Before 2016, a promoter who defaulted on bank debt could remain in control for years while creditors pursued recovery through fragmented proceedings in different forums. Delay was the promoter’s main strategy, because every month of continued control preserved access to the company’s assets and strengthened the promoter’s hand in any negotiation. Creditors had no means of compelling a time-bound resolution.

The Code introduced a collective proceeding that binds all creditors, a committee of creditors empowered to decide the outcome, and a credible liquidation alternative that gives the process its bargaining power. A case begins when a financial or operational creditor applies to the National Company Law Tribunal on the basis of a default. When the tribunal admits the application for a corporate insolvency resolution process, an interim resolution professional takes charge of the company’s affairs and the board is suspended. The promoter loses control on the day of admission, without waiting for a hearing or an appeal.

Admission also brings a moratorium, which suspends enforcement and recovery actions against the company, including enforcement under SARFAESI (see “Enforcing a secured loan under SARFAESI: from demand notice to auction”). For a buyer of debt, this is why the timing of an acquisition relative to admission matters so much. Before admission a secured creditor can enforce on its own account. After it, every creditor’s position is decided collectively.

The resolution professional has a statutory duty to preserve the company as a going concern while the process runs, which needs working capital that a defaulted company rarely has. Interim finance raised for the purpose ranks ahead of other claims in the waterfall and is among the better-protected positions in the process, though it needs close monitoring. Enterprise value decays regardless: customers and suppliers drift away, employees leave and maintenance is deferred. A long process destroys value that no plan can recover, so speed is a substantive term of any plan. Statutory periods and voting thresholds in this article are stated as they stood in April 2026.

Claims, the committee and the clock

Creditors submit claims, which the resolution professional verifies and admits. Financial creditors with admitted claims form the committee of creditors, with votes weighted by admitted claim value. The committee takes over decision-making: it invites resolution plans from prospective acquirers, evaluates competing bids and votes. A plan needs the approval of 66 per cent of the voting share, and the whole process is meant to conclude within 330 days, including any extensions the tribunal grants.

The resolution professional runs the mechanics. It constitutes the committee, collects and verifies claims, assembles the information on the company’s affairs that bidders rely on, invites plans and checks each for compliance before it reaches a vote. Resolution professionals are registered with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, which regulates both the profession and the process.

Disputes over the admission of claims are frequent, and they matter because admitted claims determine voting power. A buyer acquiring debt in order to sit on the committee should treat the admissibility of that claim as a diligence item in its own right.

The voting threshold also shapes strategy. Because a plan needs 66 per cent, a creditor or group holding more than a third of admitted claims can block any plan, while a small holder can argue its case and must then accept the majority’s decision. A buyer of debt should know before acquiring it which position it will hold on the committee and what that position can achieve.

Section 29A bars defaulting promoters and parties connected to them from bidding for the company. Of all the Code’s provisions, it did most to change behaviour. A promoter who expects to buy the company back cheaply has every reason to let it fall into insolvency. A promoter who knows that admission means losing the company permanently has every reason to settle first, which is the subject of the last section of this article.

Resolution plans, sanction and the clean slate

Prospective resolution applicants are invited against eligibility criteria. The committee evaluates their plans on total value, the structure and timing of payments, certainty of funding, the treatment of each class of creditor and the credibility of the operating plan. An approved plan goes to the tribunal for sanction, where it may be challenged. Once sanctioned, it binds every stakeholder, including dissenting creditors and government authorities.

Approval by the committee is a long way from completion. Tribunal sanction, regulatory approvals, appeals, funding, transfer of control and management transition all sit between a successful vote and control of the business, each on its own timeline. Capital committed at approval and deployed months later carries a cost that underwriting models seldom capture, so the period from approval to control should be modelled explicitly.

Two doctrines that give the process its force

Two principles established by the Supreme Court give the Code its commercial force. The first is that the committee’s commercial wisdom in choosing between plans receives minimal judicial interference. Courts do not second-guess the business judgement of creditors who bear the financial consequences, so a plan approved by the required majority is presumptively valid. The second is the clean-slate principle. An approved and sanctioned plan extinguishes all prior claims, liabilities, tax demands, regulatory penalties and pending litigation that the plan does not specifically assume, and the successful applicant receives the company free of its history.

The clean slate is what makes institutional-scale distressed investing workable. Consider an illustrative company with ₹500 crore of bank debt, ₹150 crore of disputed tax demands, ₹70 crore of pending litigation and assorted regulatory penalties. Under conventional acquisition mechanics it is close to unacquirable, because no buyer can underwrite the contingent liabilities and diligence would take months without reaching a conclusion. Through a resolution plan those historical claims are extinguished, and the acquirer receives the assets and operations for the amount specified in the plan. That certainty lets acquirers bid with confidence, and it supports the recoveries of the financial creditors who hold claims against the company. The Code also created a new category of acquisition in India, and because the process requires full disclosure of the company’s affairs, it improved the information available to buyers.

What the record shows

As at April 2026, recovery through resolution plans averaged 32 to 45 per cent of admitted claims, against about 25 per cent through the Debts Recovery Tribunals. Resolution took eighteen to twenty-two months on average, against seven to twelve years under the earlier regime. A 40 per cent recovery in eighteen months is a different proposition from a 25 per cent recovery in ten years, and that combination of higher recovery and shorter time is what changed the arithmetic for investors.

Throughput has risen steadily. Approved resolution plans rose from roughly 120 in the financial year 2019-20 to 269 in 2023-24. The 330-day limit is nevertheless routinely exceeded. Tribunal capacity, litigation over the constitution of the committee, avoidance applications and appeals all lengthen the process, and some tribunal benches carry heavier backlogs than others. An investor who underwrites an insolvency outcome to the statutory timetable is underwriting a timetable few cases keep. The practical response is to underwrite to observed timelines, price the delay and structure the position so that an extended process reduces the return without reaching principal.

Recovery against admitted claims is often cited as evidence that the Code has failed. Measured since inception, it averaged around a third as at March 2026. That figure describes the size of the hole that existed at admission, much of it dug by years of evergreening before the Code existed. For an acquirer, the relevant comparison is recovery against liquidation value, which is the floor a buyer underwrites against. Resolution creates value relative to that alternative, and it cannot restore value already lost.

179%

Realised against liquidation value across large resolved cases, as at March 2026. Liquidation value is the floor an acquirer underwrites against, which makes this the measure relevant to an investor buying into a process. Recovery against admitted claims answers a different question.

Why revival now outnumbers liquidation

As at December 2025, roughly 58 per cent of closed insolvency cases had ended in revival of the business. Early in the Code’s life liquidation was the more common outcome. The shift reflects better process quality and a deeper pool of resolution applicants. It also reflects arithmetic: across large cases, plans have consistently delivered value well above liquidation value, so a committee that chooses revival does so because revival recovers more.

An outcome mix dominated by revival favours a particular kind of buyer, one that can take operating control of a business and improve it. Financial investors are generally competent at valuing assets and structuring transactions. Far fewer can stabilise a company through the resolution period, which means keeping employees and customers, maintaining regulatory standing and funding working capital, and fewer still can do so while the process is contested.

Liquidation remains the fallback when no viable plan emerges, and it typically takes longer and recovers far less; the comparison across enforcement channels is set out in the guide. Since 2022, eligible reconstruction companies may also act as resolution applicants (see “How stressed loans change hands in India: reconstruction companies, security receipts and special situation funds”), which adds a further class of buyer able to take control of a business.

Committees have also consistently been willing to choose a plan with greater execution certainty over a nominally higher offer carrying more conditions. Payment structure, evidence of funding, regulatory approvals and the credibility of the operating plan all weigh against headline value. A bidder with real operating capability and committed capital keeps that advantage as competition for assets increases, because most competing bidders cannot manufacture it. Operating capability of this kind has to be in place well before a case becomes available.

Insolvency transactions also differ from granular loan portfolios resolved through settlement and SARFAESI enforcement in almost every respect. They need more capital and more operating capability, they run on longer timelines, and the risk sits in a single company whose value depends on the plan that wins.

How a committee compares plans: an illustrative composite

The following illustrative composite shows those criteria at work. A mid-sized building materials manufacturer with annual revenue of about ₹300 crore and aggregate bank debt of ₹500 crore runs three plants across two states. It was profitable until rising input costs, delayed receivables from infrastructure projects and debt taken on for expansion produced a liquidity crisis. It defaulted on scheduled repayments and was admitted to the insolvency process on an application by its lead lender. A reconstruction company sits on the committee with ₹60 crore of the claims, bought from one of the consortium banks at 32 per cent of outstanding, or about ₹19 crore. Three applicants submit plans.

ApplicantPaid to financial creditorsOther commitmentsCommittee’s assessment
A: strategic buyer from the same sector₹200 crore₹100 crore of working capital and plant modernisationTwenty years in the sector, supply relationships the company can use, a record of integrating acquisitions and a detailed operating plan
B: financial investor backed by a private equity fund₹230 croreWorkforce restructuring and closure of the smallest plantMost cash, no operating experience in the sector; the closure would destroy going-concern value and the workforce plan would likely face challenge under labour law
C: consortium led by a real estate developer₹180 croreLimited operational commitmentsLowest offer, with neither sector expertise nor a record of integrating acquisitions
Illustrative composite, not a real case.

Applicant A’s operating plan is specific: working capital normalised within six months, capacity utilisation targets for each plant and a capital expenditure programme aimed at efficiency. The committee approves it with 71 per cent of the vote, and the tribunal sanctions it within sixty days. Financial creditors receive ₹200 crore against ₹500 crore of claims, a recovery of 40 per cent. The reconstruction company receives its proportionate share, about ₹24 crore against its ₹60 crore claim and its entry price of about ₹19 crore, roughly eighteen months after buying the debt.

The business itself recovers. Within twenty-four months revenue stabilises at about ₹270 crore, the operating margin returns to 12 per cent from negative during the process, and the clean slate has removed about ₹120 crore of disputed tax and regulatory liabilities that would have burdened any conventional acquisition. The case shows where value accrues. Financial creditors receive moderate and comparatively reliable recoveries, in line with the range set out above. The resolution applicant that takes operating control acquires a business at a discount to replacement cost, free of historical liabilities, and takes the larger gains the process creates. That distinction bears directly on where in a case an investor chooses to commit capital.

Settlement before admission, and the finance behind it

The Code’s largest effect may lie in the cases it never processes. Before the Code, a defaulting promoter faced a negotiation whose realistic worst case was a slow restructuring on terms the promoter could heavily influence. The Code changed that worst case to the permanent loss of the company. As at March 2026, more than 30,000 cases representing approximately ₹14 lakh crore had been settled before admission, a volume considerably larger than that resolved through approved plans. Many borrowers who would once have defaulted and negotiated indefinitely now restructure voluntarily.

Most of the work is done by the threat of the process. That is the mark of a functioning insolvency regime.

A promoter facing admission needs to settle with lenders quickly and usually lacks the cash, while lenders will accept a discounted one-time settlement in exchange for immediate certainty. Settlement finance fills the gap. The cycle is measured in months, the use of proceeds is defined and the financier takes security over pledged promoter shares and business assets. The counterparty has a strong incentive to perform, since the alternative is losing the company. These transactions fail in recognisable ways.

  • Pledged shares in a company under stress are hard to value: trading is thin, and the price may not survive enforcement.
  • Settlement documentation that does not bind every lender leaves a dissenting creditor free to seek admission anyway.
  • The promoter conduct that produced the default may continue after the settlement.
  • Where the exit depends on an incoming lender that has not yet committed, the position carries refinancing risk.

The discipline is to underwrite each settlement as a secured credit with a clear route to repayment. If the security package holds and the settlement binds every lender, the risk is genuinely short-dated. If either fails, the financier is left with a claim on a company still in default, and any lender left out of the settlement can still take it to the tribunal.

Prepared for educational purposes only. Not an offer to sell securities, investment advice or a recommendation. Views are as at the date of publication and are subject to change.