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A stressed loan portfolio from purchase to recovery: an illustrative walk-through

This article follows one illustrative composite portfolio of thirty-seven non-performing bank loans from the seller’s first approach to the last recovery. Outcomes are stated as recovery against the amount outstanding, the collateral or the entry price, together with the time each took.

October 202613 min read

Contents
  1. The composite portfolio
  2. Where transactions come from
  3. Diligence on four parallel tracks
  4. The legal map and the borrower
  5. Pricing from the collateral up
  6. Assigning a recovery strategy to each account
  7. The settlement and enforcement tracks
  8. The project-completion track
  9. The problem accounts and the skills involved

The composite portfolio

The portfolio described here is an illustrative composite. It is assembled from deal patterns that recur in the Indian market and does not describe any single transaction, seller or buyer. Its figures are representative of common ranges and should not be read as point estimates or as the record of any manager. The purpose is to show how the steps of a distressed transaction connect, because decisions taken at entry shape what is possible at recovery.

A large public sector bank holds thirty-seven non-performing loans with outstanding principal and interest of about ₹400 crore. The loans are secured by a mix of commercial real estate, residential property and industrial land in Maharashtra and Gujarat. The bank has already provisioned about 60 per cent of the outstanding amount. It wants to sell because the accounts consume capital, management time and supervisory attention, and its priority is a buyer that will close on the agreed terms and timetable. The highest possible price matters to it less than certainty of execution.

The bank approaches a single buyer, an asset reconstruction company with which it has completed earlier transactions, and opens a bilateral negotiation. Nothing in the process is public. The buyer’s standing with this seller rests on a record of closing on the terms agreed, within the timelines promised, without reopening the price at the last stage. In a competitive auction, several reconstruction companies and funds would bid against one another and push the price towards the level at which the winning bidder’s margin disappears. In a bilateral sale the price also reflects the value the bank places on a reliable counterparty.

For the rules that allow a bank to sell loans to a reconstruction company, and the other routes by which stressed loans change hands, see “How stressed loans change hands in India: reconstruction companies, security receipts and special situation funds”.

Where transactions come from

The bilateral approach is one of several channels through which a stressed loan reaches a buyer in India, and each prices differently.

  • Direct bilateral approaches from banks and non-banking finance companies that want to clear specific exposures.
  • Auctions and Swiss challenge processes run by lenders, which are competitive and priced accordingly.
  • Committee of creditors processes under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, where participation depends on standing and relationships.
  • Secondary purchases of security receipts from existing holders who want liquidity.
  • Approaches from the borrower or promoter side, usually seeking settlement finance before enforcement begins.
  • Referrals from resolution professionals, advisers and other intermediaries.

A buyer’s pricing advantage sits mainly in the first and last of these. An auction exists to discover price, and in practice that removes most of the buyer’s margin. What overpaying does to the protection of capital is set out in “What protects capital in a distressed investment: collateral, entry price and time”.

A disciplined origination process behaves like a funnel, and the low conversion rate is where the discipline shows. Out of a base of more than a hundred opportunities reviewed, an initial screen on asset quality, sector viability, collateral and recovery path typically removes about two thirds. Full diligence, meaning financial forensics, legal title verification and third-party valuation, is warranted on perhaps ten to fifteen per cent. Fewer than five per cent reach an investment committee with agreed terms. These proportions illustrate a disciplined process. A conversion rate well above them more often reflects a weak screen than unusual access.

Relationships with sellers are often cited and seldom defined. In concrete terms they give early sight of an exposure before it is widely marketed, along with enough credibility that a seller will negotiate bilaterally and skip a formal process. They build slowly and cannot be bought, which is why two buyers holding the same capital can see very different deal flow.

Diligence on four parallel tracks

The buyer’s credit team has thirty-seven accounts to evaluate before its investment committee can approve a bid. Distressed diligence starts from a different premise from conventional credit work. The default has already answered whether the borrower can repay from cash flow, so the work turns to recovery: what exists, what can be reached, how long reaching it will take and what it will fetch. Financial projections carry less weight, and title, charge perfection, physical possession and enforceability carry more. The work runs on four tracks at once, each feeding the pricing model.

Collateral assessment

For each account the team identifies the assets securing the loan and records type, location, condition, occupancy and title history. Physical inspection is mandatory for every asset valued above ₹2 crore. The team visits the site, photographs the property, checks access and infrastructure, and notes any encroachment or adverse possession claim. Two independent registered valuers report on each significant asset, and the buyer’s own team cross-checks their figures against recent comparable transactions in the same micro-market. Where the two valuations differ by more than 20 per cent, a third valuer is engaged.

Title verification

Title is traced back at least thirty years. The search confirms that the property was lawfully acquired at each transfer, that registrations are in order, that no competing claim is unresolved, and that the mortgage in favour of the selling bank is properly registered and ranks ahead of later encumbrances. Land records in many states are poorly digitised, kept in more than one language and sometimes inconsistent between revenue and registration records. Local counsel in each jurisdiction run the search, because the pitfalls of record-keeping are local.

Defects found at this stage are common and costly. A prior charge that was never discharged, a mortgage imperfectly registered at the sub-registrar, land later found to be under attachment, or a plant on leasehold land whose lease prohibits transfer can each turn a secured position into an unsecured one. A defect discovered after purchase can leave the collateral partly or wholly unenforceable.

Legal landscape mapping

The third track catalogues every pending proceeding on each account: challenges the borrower has filed against enforcement, writ petitions in the High Courts, proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, criminal complaints, revenue recovery proceedings and tax claims against the collateral. Each is assessed for its potential to delay enforcement, to create a competing claim on the asset or to add cost. The legal team assigns each proceeding a probability-weighted cost and delay, which the pricing model deducts from expected recovery.

Borrower assessment

The fourth track profiles each borrower’s financial position, history of cooperation and propensity to litigate. A borrower with substantial personal assets and a record of settling when faced with credible enforcement will produce a faster and cheaper recovery than one with no visible assets and a pattern of procedural challenges. The buyer’s relationship team gathers information from market sources, prior lenders and public records, and the resulting profile informs both the recovery strategy and the price.

Where the borrower is a company, a forensic review examines related-party transactions, diversion of funds, circular trading, overstated inventory and receivables, and the conduct of promoters and auditors in the period before default. Diverted funds may be recoverable through avoidance applications, and a documented pattern of misconduct strengthens the creditor’s hand in negotiation.

For a portfolio of this size the four tracks take four to eight weeks. The output is an account-by-account projection that sets out the expected recovery, timeline, enforcement route and legal cost for each account, together with a probability-weighted downside case. The downside cases carry as much weight in the bid as the base cases. Accounts whose collateral proves impaired, or whose legal position is unusually tangled, are identified here and priced at deeper discounts than the rest, which is how the four intensive-management accounts described below entered the portfolio at a price that allowed for losses.

Pricing from the collateral up

The pricing model starts from the collateral. For each loan the team estimates recovery under the most likely enforcement route, applies a forced-sale discount to the appraised fair market value, deducts estimated legal and enforcement costs and assigns a timeline. The size of that discount depends on the type of collateral; for typical ranges, see “What protects capital in a distressed investment: collateral, entry price and time”. The projected cash flows are discounted at the buyer’s required rate of return plus a buffer for risk, and the sum across all thirty-seven accounts gives the bid.

Valuation enters the model as a range. Independent valuers are asked for realisable values under defined scenarios: an orderly sale with time, a distressed sale under enforcement, and liquidation. The spread between them is usually wide, and the price is anchored to the lower cases. If a valuation assumes an orderly sale to a strategic buyer, diligence has to identify that buyer and establish whether it has bought comparable assets before.

Recovery assumptions are checked against the buyer’s own records of earlier transactions: recovery rates, enforcement timelines and auction realisation ratios, segmented by state, district, asset type and borrower category. For the asset types and districts the buyer has worked in before, that turns pricing from a matter of judgement into a matter of evidence. A buyer without such records has to rely on projections.

The investment committee reviews the findings, challenges the assumptions and approves a bid of ₹140 crore, about 35 per cent of the ₹400 crore outstanding. The bank accepts and the assignment agreement is executed. The buyer now holds every right, security interest and enforcement option the bank held across the thirty-seven accounts.

₹140 crore

Bid for thirty-seven accounts with about ₹400 crore outstanding, or roughly 35 per cent of outstanding, from a seller that had already provisioned about 60 per cent. Illustrative composite.

Where a transaction involves new money, such as settlement finance for a borrower or funding to finish a stalled project, diligence findings belong in the terms as well as the price. The usual tools are escrow and cash sweep mechanics, covenants with pre-agreed enforcement triggers, additional security or guarantees, and funding released in stages against milestones.

Assigning a recovery strategy to each account

On the day of acquisition each account receives a primary and a secondary recovery strategy based on the diligence. The purchase price is allocated across the accounts at the same time, so that each account’s recovery can later be measured against its own entry price.

Eight accounts, where the borrowers are known to be cooperative and can reach settlement funds personally or through family, go to negotiated settlement. Fifteen have strong collateral, mostly commercial or residential property with clear title in urban or peri-urban locations, and borrowers who will not cooperate. They go to enforcement under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), with demand notices issued at once. Ten are secured by partly built real estate and go to project completion. The remaining four are classed as intensive management, to be handled case by case.

TrackAccountsProfilePlanned timelinePlanned recovery
Negotiated settlement8Cooperative borrowers with access to funds6 to 12 months50 to 75 per cent of outstanding
Enforcement under SARFAESI15Strong collateral, clear title, non-cooperative borrowers12 to 24 months40 to 65 per cent of collateral value
Project completion10Partly built residential and commercial projects18 to 30 monthsSales of finished units above entry price plus completion capital
Intensive management4Impaired collateral or complex litigationCase by casePartial write-offs allowed for in the price
Illustrative composite. Plans as set on the day of acquisition.

The assignment changes as facts emerge. A borrower on the enforcement track who receives a demand notice and, facing the loss of the property, asks to negotiate moves to the settlement track. A project that meets an unexpected regulatory obstacle may move to a straightforward auction of the collateral. Reassessment is continuous, drawing on information from the ground, legal developments and the property market, and much of the gap between what the pricing model assumed and what execution delivers comes from the quality of these decisions.

The settlement and enforcement tracks

For the eight settlement accounts the buyer’s negotiators contact each borrower. The first meeting is informational: the buyer presents the claim, explains the enforcement alternatives and proposes a discussion. Most borrowers reject the first offer. Negotiation typically runs to three to six rounds, during which the buyer calibrates the amount against its view of the borrower’s real financial capacity and the cost and time of enforcing instead.

The central lever is visible readiness to enforce. A borrower who knows the buyer can and will take possession has a strong reason to settle. A borrower who thinks the buyer is bluffing, or lacks the local capability to take possession in that district, will delay. Legal teams, working relationships with District Magistrates’ offices and a record of taking possession in contested cases therefore shape settlement outcomes directly.

Five of the eight borrowers settle within six months at an average of 65 per cent of outstanding. Two settle within nine months at about 55 per cent after longer negotiation. One refuses and moves to the enforcement track. Across the seven settled accounts the blended recovery is about 60 per cent of outstanding, reached in an average of about six months.

The track ran close to plan. The planned range was 50 to 75 per cent of outstanding within six to twelve months, and the result sat in the middle of that range and at the fast end of the timeline. Settlement recoveries are measured against the amount outstanding because the borrower negotiates against the claim. Enforcement recoveries are measured against collateral value, because an auction realises the asset, whatever the size of the claim against it.

The enforcement track, now sixteen accounts with the borrower who refused to settle, begins with demand notices on the first day after acquisition. Some borrowers respond with settlement proposals and change track; others object, litigate or stay silent, and the enforcement process runs its course. For how the sixteen accounts fared, the statutory steps from demand notice to auction and the way state and asset type change the timeline, see “Enforcing a secured loan under SARFAESI: from demand notice to auction”.

The project-completion track

The ten project-completion accounts involve partly constructed residential and commercial projects. The buyer takes possession under SARFAESI, commissions independent assessments of the remaining cost, timeline and approvals, and appoints third-party project management companies to carry out the work.

The economics differ from enforcement. The buyer invests further capital to turn a half-finished structure into saleable units, and recovery comes from that work as well as from the collateral as it stood. In one project in the composite, the account was acquired for ₹12 crore, needed ₹8 crore of further construction and produced completed inventory worth ₹35 crore. Beyond taking possession, the outcome on that project depended on construction and sales, with no court decision involved.

The main risks are construction cost overruns and regulatory delay, which covers amended building permissions, re-registration under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, and occupation certificates. A further risk is absorption, since the local market may not take the finished units at the projected price within the projected period. Each can be assessed before completion capital is committed, through reliable construction cost estimates, a review of the approvals required and absorption data for the micro-market.

Across the ten projects the average time from acquisition to sale of the completed inventory was about twenty-four months, longer than either of the other main tracks. Completion capital is paid on top of the purchase price, so a project of this kind ties up more money for longer than an enforcement account of similar size.

For a stabilised commercial asset with tenants in place, India’s real estate investment trust framework offers an exit route to institutional ownership that did not exist a decade ago. Underwriting that exit requires the asset to meet the framework’s standards on title, occupancy and structure, and those standards are best tested at acquisition.

The problem accounts and the skills involved

The four intensive-management accounts were expected to underperform and were priced for it. Two of them, one held up by litigation and one lost to a defect that diligence could not detect, are followed in detail in “What goes wrong in distressed investing, and how investors can monitor it”.

The walk-through draws on skills that apply whatever sector the borrower operated in:

  • Title verification and confirmation that charges are properly registered and ranked.
  • Forensic examination of related-party flows and diverted funds.
  • Enforcement strategy and the practical mechanics of taking possession.
  • Negotiation with a committee of creditors and with a promoter facing loss of control.
  • Structuring for the downside through escrow, cash sweeps, covenants and enforcement triggers.

A team that has enforced against a hotel can enforce against a factory, because the constraints are legal and operational. Two things do need sector knowledge. Realisable value depends on who buys a specific asset and why, which is industry knowledge. Turnaround, where the buyer takes control of a business or finishes a project, depends on understanding how that business or project works. In practice buyers cast a wide net in origination and bring specific expertise, often from outside, to the valuation and turnaround questions on each asset.

The composite also shows why progress is reported account by account. Seven settled accounts, sixteen enforcement accounts, ten projects and four problem positions each followed a different path, and their cash arrived at different times, from about six months for the settlements to about two years for the projects. What position-level reporting should contain is covered in “What goes wrong in distressed investing, and how investors can monitor it”.

Prepared for educational purposes only. Not an offer to sell securities, investment advice or a recommendation. Views are as at the date of publication and are subject to change.